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INTERPRETING CODES 
Bruce W. Frier* 
On December 1, 1944, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute formally 
agreed to cosponsor the creation of a Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC), with Professor Karl Llewellyn serving as its Chief Reporter 
and Soia Mentschikoff as Associate Chief Reporter. 1 Two years later, 
as the earliest drafts of the UCC were circulating, Dean Roscoe Pound 
published a general article on the character of modem law.2 In this 
article he surveyed the modem codification movement, as well as the 
objections to it. He concluded: 
The most serious objection to a code in a comttlon-law jurisdiction is 
that we have no well developed common-law technique of developing 
legislative texts. Our technique of statutory interpretation is not ade-
quate to the application of a code. 3 
If correct, Pound's objection is a serious one. Of course, it can be 
argued that the UCC is not a code at all, but rather "a big statute or a 
collection of statutes bound together in the same book";4 and certainly 
the UCC is at some remove from traditional civil law codes. The UCC 
does not strive for completeness even within the commercial sphere, 
nor is it nearly so closely drafted as the traditional codes of European 
civil law.5 More important is the UCC's status not as a national law, 
but as state law within numerous distinct jurisdictions; this has meant 
not only appreciable variations in enacted wording and in judicial in-
terpretation, but also a complex and shifting interaction with both fed-
• Professor of Classics and Roman Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Trinity Col-
lege; Ph.D. 1970, Princeton. - Ed. 
1. For a historical reconstruction, see W. Tw!NJNG, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REAusr 
MOVEMENT 270-301 (1973). 
2. Pound, Sources and Forms of Law, 22 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 46-80 (1946). 
3. Id. at 76. 
4. Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does/or the Past, 26 LA. L. REv. 285, 286 (1966). Gilmore 
believed that the UCC would not substantially displace "[t]he solid stuff of pre-Code law." Id. at 
286. But it is doubtful that pre-Code law has much current influence in interpreting the UCC. 
5. For a short description of the major European codes, see A. WATSON, THE MAKING OF 
THE C1vJL LAW 99-130 (1981). For more detail, see 1 K.. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, EINFOHRUNG 
IN nm REcHTSVERGLBICHUNG (1971), especially chapters 6-10, "Der romanische Rechtskreis," 
(The Romanistic Legal Family) and chapters 11-15, "Der deutsche Reichtskreis" (The German 
Legal Family). For an English translation, see 1 K.. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO CoMPARATIVE LAW (T. Weir trans. 1977). For possible civil law influences on the UCC, see 
Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental Experience to 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TuL. L. REV. 1125 (1982). 
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eral and state laws and regulations. 6 
Still, because of its nearly universal adoption in a form and word-
ing that approximate the model, the UCC can at least be described as 
"code-like" - something more, in any case, than an ordinary statute. 7 
In this brief article, rather than tackling the exceptionally difficult 
question of how the UCC is (or ought to be) interpreted as a code,8 I 
want only to point to some features of European experience in inter-
preting codes, and to argue that these features are not inconsistent 
with, and may even to some extent prefigure, emerging patterns in the 
interpretation of the UCC. Since these shared interpretive patterns 
have arisen independently, they suggest that the form of legal materi-
als can exert considerable influence on the formation of legal cultures. 
The Salience of General Clauses. Like the UCC, European codes 
contain norms that vary widely in the breadth of their formulation and 
in the level of their abstraction. An example is the German Civil Code 
(the BGB), whose articles range from the extreme specificity of section 
961 ("If a swarm of bees moves out, it becomes ownerless if the owner 
does not immediately pursue it or if the owner gives up the pursuit")9 
to the sweeping breadth of section 138(1) ("A legal transaction which 
is against public policy is void").10 "General clauses" (General-
klauseln, principes generaux) of the latter type, with a vague but unde-
niable ethical content, appear in all European civil codes. 
In the present century, European judges have seized upon such 
general clauses as a legislative derogation to them of a general "moral" 
authority and supervision in administering the codes; the general 
clauses have accordingly become a standard vehicle for achieving what 
is now almost universally recognized (at least in academic circles) as 
judicial legislation.11 An outstanding example is BGB section 242, 
6. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDB § 3, at 6-9 (3d ed. 1988) (stu· 
dent edition). 
7. On the nature of codification, see Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 
48 LA. L. RBv. 1073 (1988). Berge] distinguishes two types: "substantive or true codification," 
the goal of which is "to achieve a material and systematic structure of the law," and "formal 
codification,'' aiming "only to succeed in regrouping and classifying existing texts." Id. at 1097. 
The UCC is a clear example of the former. Id. at 1076, 1092. 
8. See, e.g., Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291 
(arguing that the UCC should be interpreted as a ''true code"); see also McDonnell, Purposive 
Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. 
PA. L. RBv. 795 (1978). 
9. THE GERMAN ClyJL CoDB § 961 (I. Forrester, S. Goren & H. Dgen trans. 1975) (English 
translation of BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, commonly known as BGB). 
10. THE GERMAN Civn. CoDE, supra note 9, § 138(1). 
11. R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURF.S, SoURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 194-207 
(M. Kindred trans. 1972) ("Supereminent Principles"); see also 0. KAHN-FREUND, C. U.VY & 
B. RUDDEN, SoURCE·BOOK ON FRENCH LAW 176-98 (2d ed. 1979) (a thorough discussion with 
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providing that: "The debtor is bound to effect performance according 
to the requirements of good faith, giving consideration to common us-
age."12 Although this section was originally "confined to regulating 
the manner and method of the duty to perform," it has been judicially 
transformed into "a 'super control norm' for the whole BGB, and in-
deed for large parts of German law outside it .... a 'principle of legal 
ethics,' which dominates the entire legal system."13 A recent exhaus-
tive commentary on section 242 alone runs to some 1553 pages.14 
In a thoughtful article, the late John Dawson tried to assess the 
significance of such general clauses in the development of modem 
German law.15 On the one hand, he accepted the.logic that had con-
verted such clauses into "super control norms": "By including these 
clauses the draftsmen of the Code and legislature acknowledged both 
that the Code was incomplete and that it needed to be supplemented, 
primarily through judicial action, from sources outside the Code."16 
On the other hand, he admitted the dangers of the temptation they 
provided as "express licenses to judges to go out hunting any\vhere 
and bring back their trophies, to be hung then in the living room."17 
The UCC, of course, also contains general clauses of wide breadth, 
such as section 2-302 (on unconscionable contracts or contract 
clauses),18 or section 1-203, providing that: "Every contract or duty 
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance 
or enforcement."19 But as yet it can hardly be said that either section 
has emerged as a "super control norm. "20 Of course, American judges 
some excellent illustrations); cf. K. LARENZ, METHODENLBHRE DER REcHl'SWISSENSCHAFI' 
276-81 (5th ed. 1983). 
12. THE GERMAN Civn. CoDB, supra note 9, § 242. 
13. N. HORN, H. KOTz & H. LF.SER, GERMAN PRlvATB AND CoMMBRCIAL LAW: AN 
lNTRonucnoN 135 (T. Weir trans. 1982) (footnote omitted) (quoting I Protokolle zum BGB 
303); cf. id. at 135-45 ("The Principle of Good Faith: § 242 BGB;" "its function is to justify the 
value-judgments of the judge"). 
14. 2 W. WEBER, J. VON STAUDINGERS KOMMBNTAR ZUM B'llRGBRLICHBN GBSSETZBUCH, 
TEIL lB: § 242 (11th ed. 1961), cited in 1 E. CoHBN, MANuAL OF GERMAN LAW 101 (1968). 
15. Dawson, The General Clauses, Viewed from a Distance, 41 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr 441 
(1977). 
16. Id. at 444. In fact, this "acknowledgement" is usually a legru fiction. 
17. Id. at 445. On the German ''flight into the general clauses" during the troubled 1920s 
and 1930s, see J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 461-79 (1968). The phrase is from J. 
HEDEMANN, Dm FLUCHT IN nm GBNBRALKLAUSBLN (1933). 
18. u.c.c. § 2-302 (1987). 
19. u.c.c. § 1-203 (1987). 
20. For a discussion of§ 2-302 as a "supereminent provision," see Hawkland, supra note 8, 
at 305-07. It is doubtful, however, that the section has yet been used by courts more generally as 
a key to understanding the UCC in its entirety. On unconscioliability in German and American 
law, see Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The Gennan Version, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1041, 1042-
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do not necessarily require legislative authorization for the equitable 
expansion of law. 
More significant, perhaps, has been the fate of less grandiose gen-
eral clauses such as UCC section 1-106(1), which provides for the "lib-
eral administration" of UCC remedies with the stated goal of placing 
"the aggrieved party ... in as good a position as if the other party had 
fully performed."21 This clause has frequently been used to solve 
knotty problems arising out of the draftsmanship of UCC remedy 
clauses,22 for example, in the case of defaulting sellers, the vexed issue 
of the interrelationship of cover with market-difference damages under 
sections 2-712 and 713;23 or, in the case of defaulting buyers, the awk-
ward language of section 2-708 in determining whether to award mar-
ket-difference damages or lost profits. 24 Reasonable solutions have 
been located virtually in the teeth of the UCC's express wording.25 
The success of section 1-106 has largely depended on the dexterity 
of commentators and judges in bringing it to bear on clear and specific 
problems, with the aim "to scale down the apparently unlimited man-
date of the general clause, to restructure it into distinct subordinate 
norms that become intelligible and manageable through their nar-
rowed scope and function."26 The fate of still broader sections, such 
as section 1-203 or section 2-302, is likely to depend on whether this 
44 (1976) (stressing the narrowness of the American doctrine). This fine article raises many of 
the themes I am touching on. 
The good faith required under the UCC is generally conceptualized fairly narrowly, as an 
"excluder'' aimed at specific types of undesirable conduct. See Summers, "Good Faith" in Gen-
eral Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, S4 VA. L. REV. 195 
(1968); see also Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and Conceptua/lza. 
tian, 61 CoRNELL L. REv. 810 (1982) (arguing that the concept of good faith in the REsrATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OP CoNTRACTS § 205, is broader than that in the u.c.c. § 1-203). 
But see also the related issue of whether U.C.C. § 1-203 generates claims based upon a duty 
of good faith alone, apart from duties imposed by other UCC clauses: compare Chandler v. 
Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818, (Ala. App. 1976) (no) with Reid v. Key Bank ofS. Maine, Inc., 821 F.2d 
9 (1st Cir. 1987) (yes, through reference to U.C.C. § 1-106). 
21. u.c.c. § 1-106(1). 
22. 11. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 17 n.86 (3d ed. 1988) (prac-
titioner edition) (cases cited). 
23. The leading case is Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., 162 Cal. App. 
3d 905, 209 Cal. Rptr. 60, 39 U.C.C. 1567 (1984). See generally 1. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra 
note 6, § 6-4, at 263-65. 
24. 1. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, §§ 7-11-7-12, at 318-24. A major case is Nobs 
Chemical, USA v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980) (restricting buyer to lost profit 
under § 2-708(2), and not allowing a claim for market-based damages, despite the clear statutory 
language against such restriction); see also White, The Decline of the Contract Market Damage 
Model, 11 U. ARK. LrITLE ROCK LJ. 1 (1988-89). 
25. By contrast, U.C.C. §§ 1-102(1) and (2), setting out the Code's general purposes and 
principles of construction, has had more limited effect. See 1. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 
6, § 4, at 14-18. 
26. Dawson, supra note 20, at 1044. 
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interpretive process can be replicated for them.21 
Expansion of the Interpretive Community. The general clauses are 
only the most conspicuous examples of the open draftsmanship of 
most European codes. This style is deliberate. As the drafters of the 
French Civil Code put it: 
The function of the [codified] law (loi) is to fix, in broad outline, the 
general maxims of justice (droit), to establish principles rich in sugges-
tiveness (consequences), and not to descend into the details of the ques-
tions that can arise in each subject. 
It is for the judge and the lawyer, embodied with the general spirit of 
the laws, to direct their application. 2s 
Subsequent European codes have generally followed this highly suc-
cessful style; that is to say, they deliberately envisage future legal de-
velopment without trying to determine, except in a general manner, 
the exact course that this development will take. 
In practice, legal development under the European codes has been 
largely accomplished through fruitful cooperation between judges and 
academics; or, as the French express it, between "case law" (jurispru-
dence) and academic writing (doctrine). 29 The distinction is in princi-
ple one of function: "On the one side are the [academic] writers, who 
examine legal problems in a detached manner, without any concern 
for the problems of immediate application; on the other side is the 
practical life in its diverse forms, which develops the solutions for con-
crete cases. " 30 
What this comes down to is a partnership in which legal scholars 
are conceded great authority to organize and analyze the case law; 
indeed, judges widely understand the legal content and impact of their 
own decisions through the intermediary of academic writing. Particu-
larly in areas where law is uncertain or disputed, academic writings 
often have decisive impact on legal change.31 
27. Dawson seems pessimistic: "We have much to learn from German law and should be 
willing to admire the German achievement. It does not follow that we have the means to emu-
late it." Id. at 1126. 
28. A. VON MmiREN, Tim ClvIL LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR TIIE CoM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 58 (1957) (quoting 1 J. DB LocRE, LA LEGISLATION DB LA FRANCE 
258 (1827)). 
29. French judges form jurisprudence through their decisions because they are historical 
heirs of the Roman jurists (jurisprudentes) as law-finders. There is nothing academic or theoreti-
cal about their jurisprudence. 
30. F. GENY, MBTHODB D'INTERPRETATION BT SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF 308 
(trans. 2d ed. 1954); cf. R. DAVID, supra note 11, at 189-90. 
31. R. DAVID, supra note 11, at 188-93; M. GLENDON, M. GoRDON & c. OsAKWB, CoM-
PARATIVE LEGAL TRADmONS: TExT, MATERIALS AND CASES 208-11 (1985); 0. KAHN-
FRBUND, C. LEVY & B. RUDDEN, supra note 11, at 166-76; Dawson, supra note 20, at 1122-23. 
But the importance of doctrine appears to be declining. F. LAWSON, A. ANToN & L. BROWN, 
AMOS AND WALTON'S INTRODUCilON TO FRENCH LAW 12-14 (2d ed. 1963); Glendon, The 
2206 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:2201 
To be sure, the prominence of legal academics in civil law systems 
is partially explicable through history; European universities have 
played a large role in articulating legal principles since at least the 
twelfth century.32 But the sheer bulk and internal complexity of the 
great European codes have, if anything, tended to prolong academic 
influence, at any rate once interpretation extends beyond the bare 
"grammatical" meaning of a code's provisions. Of course, it is in no 
way surprising that universities, as centers for legal education, should 
concern themselves heavily with analysis and systematization of law, 
as well as with legal criticism. More surprising is that the resulting 
scholarship continues to have such marked reflexive impact on judicial 
practice. The existence of the codes, and the felt necessity on the part 
of European judges to justify legal change through reference to 
them, 33 may provide part of the explanation. 
If this view is correct, then despite the enormous difference in legal 
cultures, one might anticipate that within the United States as well the 
adoption of codes such as the UCC would also lead to judges accord-
ing greater weight to academic writings. 34 This is particularly true 
because one aim of the UCC is "to make uniform the law among the 
various jurisdictions."35 If uniformity is to occur, then some form of 
external vigilance is required to prevent the inevitable entropy of con-
flicting interpretations within the states. 36 
This problem was, of course, foreseen. The Master Edition of the 
UCC keeps track of most cases interpreting the code; important cases 
also are reported at length, with brief notes: in the UCC Reporting 
Service. 31 The larger task of analyzing, criticizing, and integrating 
Sources of Law in a Changing Legal Order, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 663, 666-73 (1984) (attribut-
ing the decline in part to the rise of statutory law). 
32. 1 H. CoING, liANDBUCH DER QUELLEN UND LITERATURE DER NEUEREN EUROPIS-
CHEN PRlvATRECHTSGESCHICHTE 41-51 (H. Coing ed. 1973); J. MERRYMAN, THE ClvIL LAW 
TRADmoN: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OP WESTI!RN EUROPE AND LATIN 
AMERICA 56-67 (2d ed. 1985). 
33. R. DAVID, supra note 11, at 167 (''Even in those cases where [the French judge] most 
clearly rewrites the statute, he sees himself applying it and interpreting it. He does not think he 
is making law and would be surprised to have his actions thus be characterized."). 
34. For empirical evidence that academic writings have increasing weight in judicial opin-
ions, see Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of 
the California Supreme Caurt In 1950, 196(), and 1970. SOS. CAL. L. REv. 381 (1977); cf. Rhein-
stein, Leader Groups in American Law, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 687, 693-96 (1971) (on the rising 
influence of American academics). 
35. U.C.C. § l-102(2)(c); see also General Camment to U.C.C., 1 U.L.A. xv (1988) ("Uni-
formity throughout American jurisdictions is one of the main objectives of this Code; and that 
objective cannot be obtained without substantial uniformity of construction."). 
36. This danger is real. See generally Minahan, The Eroding Unlfonnity of the Unlfonn 
Cammercial Code, 65 KY. LJ. 799 (1977). 
37. U.C.C., U.L.A. (m v. 1-5, 1968 & Supps. 1991) (master ed.); U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) (beginning in 1965). 
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UCC decisions has largely fallen to a small number of commercial 
lawyers and to academics. Not surprisingly, almost immediately fol-
lowing its general adoption in the mid-1960s, the UCC became the 
subject of specialized periodicals.38 Aspects of the UCC have also 
been discussed in numerous academic articles, including a large 
number of law journal symposia devoted to it specifically. 39 
More significant still is the swift appearance of treatises, both long 
and short, intended to assist in interpreting and implementing the 
UCC.40 Here pride of place undoubtedly goes to White and Summers, 
whose relatively concise treatise41 has been widely hailed, since its first 
edition in 1972, as capturing the legal spirit of the UCC: "comprehen-
sive, highly analytic yet readable, often practically oriented, and punc-
tuated by flashes of humor."42 During the past three decades, this 
treatise has been cited in more than two thousand published judicial 
opinions. 43 Although the authors often range well in advance of ex-
isting holdings, not just criticizing previous decisions but anticipating 
future ones, the treatise is usually treated by courts as expressing the 
prevailing contemporary opinion of commentators. 
The influence of academic writings is, of course, difficult to assess 
exactly, apart from obvious examples such as Arthur Leff's largely 
successful effort to limit the sweep of unconscionability in UCC sec-
tion 2-302.44 An instructive and well-known instance is the early 
Roto-Lith decision of 1962,45 a First Circuit opinion which, following 
38. See, e.g., U.C.C. LJ. (since 1986); U.C.C. L. LETIER (since 1967). The Business Lawyer 
also carries an annual critical survey of significant UCC cases; the Commercial Law Journal 
carries regularly updated bibliographies. 
39. By a rough count, since 1960 law journals have published about thirty-five symposia on 
theUCC. 
40. R. ALDERMAN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE (1st 
ed. 1964); R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE (1st ed. 1961; 3d ed. 1981); W. HA WK· 
LAND, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE SERIES (1982); T. QUINN, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 
CoMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST (1978) (with two volumes of ciimulative supplement to 1989); 
see also UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE CASE DIGEST (J. Willis ed. 1976-1988); W. WILLIER & 
F. MART, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE REPORTER-DIGEST (1965·present). A large number 
of treatises are also devoted to specialized subjects, particularly article 9. 
41. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6. 
42. Weinberg, Book Review, 58 MINN. L. REv. 712, 714 (1974). 
43. A LEXIS search conducted on August 2, 1991, revealed 2378 cases: 966 federal cases, 
1412 state cases. The search was conducted under the form: "White w/10 Summers w/10 Uni-
form Commercial Code." 
44. Leif, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 
485, 487 (1967) (analyzing unconscionability into substantive and procedural heads, despite the 
absence of support for this view in the text or comments). Lefi"s article is the starting point in 
modem applications ofU.C.C. § 2-302. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 4-3, 
at 186. Contrast with Leff the far more thoughtful article of Ellihnghaus, In Defense of Uncon-
scionability, 78 YALE LJ. 757 (1969), which has had little influence. 
45. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). 
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ordinary common law modes of statutory interpretation, construed 
UCC section 2-207 ("Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirma-
tion") through reliance on the traditional "mirror image" doctrine of 
contract formation. 46 The decision was greeted by a hail of adverse 
academic commentary,47 and was also stigmatized by White and Sum-
mers.48 Such criticism has sharply restricted the influence of Roto-
Lith within other jurisdictions. 49 Though the First Circuit has stuck 
to its guns, by 1990 even its district courts were rebelling.so 
Whether or not such instances can correctly be described as em-
bodying a trend, the possible effect of increased academic influence 
merits reflection. Academics bear an increasingly heavy responsibility 
not to mislead courts. 51 More generally, European experience sug-
gests that the character and quality of academic doctrine vary consid-
erably from nation to nation, especially in the degree of its practicality 
46. 297 F.2d at 500. 
47. Student notes were almost uniformly hostile. See, e.g., Note, Commercial Law - Offer 
and Acceptance - Under Uniform Commercial Code Purchaser of Goods is Bound by Disclaimer 
of Warranties Contained in Seller's Expression of Acceptance, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1481 (1963); 
Note, Nonconforming Acceptances Under Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: An 
End to the Battle of the Forms, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 540 (1963); Note, Sales-Offeree's Response 
Materially Altering an Offer Solely to Offeror's Disadvantage Is an Acceptance Conditional on 
Offeror's Assent to the Additional Terms Under Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
111 U. PA. L. REv. 132 (1962); Note, Sales-Uniform Commercial Code-''Acceptance" Varying 
Terms of Offer, 42 B.U. L. Rev. 373 (1962). But see Note, Uniform Commercial Code: Variation 
Between Offer and Acceptance Under Section 2-207, 1962 DUKE L.J. 613, 617 ("an equitable 
recognition of reasonable commercial expectations"). Early negative reaction also included Dav-
enport, How to Handle Sole of Goods: The Problem of Conflicting Purchase Orders and Accept-
ances and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus. LAW. 7S, 8S (1963). 
The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code used a different route to 
promote uniform interpretation: amending the Comments. In 1966, Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-
207 was changed to express disapproval of Roto-Lith. "The courts take to the comments like 
ducks to water, even though the legislature did not enact the comments." J. WHITB & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 6, § 4, at 12; cf. Note, The Jurisprudence and Judicial Treatment of the Com· 
ments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 CoRNELL L. REV. 962 (1990). 
48. In their first edition, White and Summers described Roto-Lith as an "infamous case." J. 
WHITB & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDB 
26 (1972) [hereinafter J. WHITB & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK]. Courts have often cited that 
phrase; in the third edition, it is softened to "well-known case." J. WHITB & R. SUMMBRS, supra 
note 6, § 1-3, at 33. 
49. Typical is C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Intl. Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235 n.S (7th Cir. 1977). In 
rejecting Roto-Lith, the court notes that this decision has been "subjected to severe criticism by 
the commentators," and then cites a general treatise, J. WHITB & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK 
supra note 48, at 26 ("infamous case" reference); a specialized treatise on sales, R. DUBSBNBBRO 
& L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDBR THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDB 
§ 3.0S[a][ii] (1990); and an article, Davenport, supra note 47, at 79, 85. 
SO. Compare Teradyne, Inc. v. Mastek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, SS (1st Cir. 1986) (reaffirming 
Roto-Lith) with Polyclad Laminates, Inc. v. VITS Maschinenbau GmbH, 749 F. Supp. 342, 344 
(D. N.H. 1990) (abandoning Roto-Lith in the teeth of Teradyne). 
51. White and Summers, explaining the origin of the Statute of Frauds, present a hypotheti· 
cal case as fact. J. WHITB & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 2-1, at 66-67. This "case" is re-
counted virtually verbatim, as history, in Thomson Printing Mach. Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 
714 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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and sensitivity to particular cases. At worst, as in Italy, scholars may 
ignore judicial decisions altogether.s2 Such an outcome is, of course, 
hardly likely in the United States; but even here courts need to be 
warned against too swift reliance on academic authority.s3 
Expanded Concepts of Interpretation. The salience of general 
clauses, coupled with the existence of a larger and more intricate inter-
pretive community, fosters the emergence of interpretive concepts that 
are more venturesome than those courts traditionally apply to statutes. 
To be sure, European legal theory normally does not draw sharp 
meth<;Xiological distinctions between interpreting codes and statutes. 54 
But the comprehensive character of codes, and also their intricacy and 
long-term stability, have tended to encourage greater breadth of 
interpretation. ss 
Traditional European theory distinguishes four types of interpreta-
tion: (1) grammatical or literal interpretation of what a given text 
means or may mean; (2) logical interpretation of the text in the con-
text of all other rules of positive law; (3) historical interpretation based 
upon evidence of the legislator's actual intent or purpose; and (4) tele-
ological interpretation construing a text in the way that best represents 
or promotes a contemporary view of social welfare and justice. s6 In 
practice, arguments from these four types of interpretation are flexibly 
combined within a single, continuous interpretive process, the various 
types played off against one another as the exigencies of a situation 
demand. But it is usually conceded that, ceteris paribus, this list of 
types is hierarchical, in the sense that a clearly convincing grammati-
cal or logical interpretation will ordinarily defeat one based on legisla-
tive intent or on a contemporary construction of purpose. s7 
Despite the difference in wording, much of this apparatus has its 
fairly clear counterpart in traditional Anglo-American statutory inter-
S2. R. DAVID, supra note 11, at 188-93. 
S3. McDonnell, supra note 8, at 824-28. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, 
§ 17-2, at 717-27, largely reversing their earlier position, under U.C.C. § 4-213 and§ 4-302, that 
a bank has no right to restitution from payee after final but erroneous payment on a check. The 
authors attribute their earlier view to ''the ignorance of youth," id. at 727, and cite an impressive 
student note, Note, Commercial Paper and Forgery: Broader Liability for Banks?, 1980 U. ILL. 
L.F. 813, as "demonstrat[mg] our errors." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 17-2, at 
722. See now the officially proposed amendment, § 3-418. 
54. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN nm WORLD TODAY: AN INTRo-
DUCI'ION TO nm CoMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 104 (2d ed. 1978) (''When interpreted by 
[European] jurists, codes and statutes are treated on exactly the same basis."). 
SS. R. DAVID, supra note 11, at 1S9-60 (noting a tendency of French courts ''to consider new 
statutes as abnormal appendages to the French legal system, to restrict their scope, applicability 
and effects," until these statutes become fully integrated into the legal system). 
56. See id. at 1S7-60; K. LARENz, supra note 11, at 30S-2S. 
S1. R. DAVID, supra note 11, at 164-67. 
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pretation. Although various commentators have recommended inter-
preting the UCC largely or solely on the basis oflegislative purpose or 
a "rationale-oriented" approach,58 it is unclear, at least to me, that 
traditional modes of interpretation are much disturbed by the exist-
ence of the UCC; both scholarly and judicial arguments still usually 
begin from the apparent meaning of the UCC's provisions, and move 
on to other types of interpretation only when no satisfactory answer is 
obtained. What has changed, of course, is the willingness of interpret-
ers to be satisfied with quick answers based on "plain meaning." The 
intricacy of the UCC has encouraged judges to hold themselves open 
to a deeper probe of its meaning. 
Nonetheless, the existence of codes, with more or less stable and 
therefore predictable texts, 59 has eventually brought about a changed 
attitude toward more fundamental issues of interpretation. This 
changed attitude is clearly illustrated in an influential passage from the 
German jurist Rudolph Sohm: 
A rule of law may be worked out either by developing the conse-
quences which it involves, or by developing the wider principles which it 
presupposes .... The more important of these two methods of procedure 
is the second, i.e. the method by which, from given rules of law, we 
ascertain the major premisses which they presuppose. For having ascer-
tained such major premisses, we shall find that they involve, in their 
logical consequences, a series of other legal rules not directly contained 
in the sources from which we obtained our rule. 60 
In relationship to codes, the inductive process that Sohm recommends 
is expansive in two senses: first, it aims to solve problems arising 
under a code through reference to broader principles that the code 
may be held to embody; second, it aims to solve problems arising 
outside a code through extension of these same principles, by the appli-
cation of analogy.61 The general clauses of a code take on particular 
force in the context of such inductive reasoning. 
58. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 4, at 18 ("rationale-oriented" approach); 
McDonnell, supra note 8, at 829-55 Qegislative purpose). The authors of the UCC clearly fa-
vored such approaches. ''This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its under-
lying purposes and policies.'' U.C.C. § 1-102(1); see also U.C.C. § 1-102(1) official comment 1. 
59. In the case of the UCC, however, textual stability is a problem in itself. J. WHITE & R. 
SUMMERS, supra note 6, §§ 3, 7, at 7-9, 21 ("the continuing stream of 'official' amendments alone 
accounts for much of today's lack of uniformity in the text"). 
60. R. SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A 1'ExTBooK OF THE HlsToRY AND SYSTEM OF ROMAN 
PRlvATE LAW 30 (J. Ledlie trans. 3d ed. 1907 & reprint 1970). 
61. On analogy, see the good discussion by K. LARENZ, supra note 11, at 365-75. Larenz 
stresses the difference between the "isolated analogy'' (Einzelanalogie: direct extension of a rule 
governing A to a similar but unregulated B) and "general analogy" (Gesamtanalogie: recogni-
tion of a broader principle above the rule governing A, followed by the principle's extension to 
similar situations). The latter method, which is especially common in constitutional law, uses 
induction. 
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As to analogy, the drafters of the UCC expressly favored its use, 62 
and academic commentators swiftly adopted a similar line. 63 In a 
steadily growing number of decisions, courts have been willing to ex-
tend the UCC by analogy, thereby abandoning older doctrine on nar-
row construction of statutes. 64 
More intricate is the process of solving interpretive problems that 
arise under the UCC. An example is UCC section 1-207, which pro-
vides that: "A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs 
or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner de-
manded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the 
rights reserved. Such words as 'without prejudice,' 'under protest' or 
the like are suflicient."65 If a debtor offers a check for less than the full 
amount claimed by the creditor but in "full satisfaction," and the cred-
itor then cashes the check after writing "under protest" on it, does this 
section have the effect of reserving the creditor's right to then claim 
the balance due? Does section 1-207 therefore replace earlier common 
law rules on accord and satisfaction? 
This vexed problem has deeply divided both commentators and 
courts. 66 The issue is very close, and reasonable persons are bound to 
differ. The broad language of section 1-207 fairly clearly favors its 
application to "full satisfaction" checks, as does the section's place-
ment among the "General Provisions" of article 1. On the other hand, 
both the Official Comments to the section and its legislative history 
seem to argue against application, though they are not decisive. Nor 
do the equities of the situation seem completely clear. Final resolution 
of the debate will doubtless require altering the UCC;67 in the 
62. E.g., U.C.C. § 1-102 official comment 1 (''This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, 
since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece oflegislation, it will provide its own machinery 
for the expansion of commercial practices."). Note how the Comment relates semi-permanence 
to the use of analogy. 
63. See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 
CoLUM. L. REV. 880 (1965). For a later example, see Rapson, A ''Home Run" Application of 
Established Principles of Statutory Construction: UCC Analogies, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 441 
(1984). 
64. Some examples are listed in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 18, n.88. 
65. u.c.c. § 1-207. 
66. As to commentators, compare, for example, J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, 
§ 13-24, at 607-10 (for applying§ 1-207) with Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction: Section 1-
207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 48 (1978) (against). As to courts, 
compare Hom Waterproofing Corp. v. Brushwick Iron & Steel, Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 497 
N.Y.S.2d 310, 488 N.E.2d 56 (1985) (for application) with County Fire Door Corp. v. C.F. 
Wooding Co., 202 Conn. 277, 520 A.2d 1028 (1987) (against). Both are exceptionally well-
reasoned cases. 
67. An officially proposed amendment to § 1-207 has eliminated the section's applicability to 
accord and satisfaction, in conformance with the added§ 3-311 ("Accord and Satisfaction by 
Use of Instrument"). U.C.C. Foll.§ 3-605, 2 U.L.A. official comment 3, at 500-01(West1991). 
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meantime, however, it is appalling, and entirely contrary to the UCC's 
spirit, that different laws prevail, in jurisdictions so closely commer-
cially linked as New York State and Connecticut, on such a common 
device as a "full satisfaction" check. 
In the 1987 Country Fire Door decision,68 Chief Justice Ellen Pe-
ters of Connecticut articulates what is now the majority position 
against applying section 1-207 to "full satisfaction" checks. She ar-
gues for the importance of reconciling this provision with those found 
in other articles of the UCC, including both article 3 on commercial 
paper including checks, and article 2 on the sale of goods. While "Ar-
ticle 3 provides little support for reading [section 1-207] to permit a 
creditor unilaterally to change the terms of a check tendered in full 
satisfaction of an unliquidated debt," section 1-207 "has a close and 
harmonious connection with article 2. "69 As she reasons: 
Article 2 regulates ongoing conduct in the performance of contracts 
for the sale of goods. That article recurrently draws inferences from ac-
quiescence in, or objection to, the performance tendered by one of the 
contracting parties. A course of performance "accepted or acquiesced in 
without objection" is relevant to a determination of the meaning of a 
contract of sale. [U.C.C. § 2-208.] ... A buyer who is confronted by a 
defective tender of goods must make a seasonable objection or lose his 
right of rejection. [U.C.C. §§ 2-602(1), 2-605, 2-606(1), 2-607(2).] •.. 
In an installment sale, a party aggrieved by nonconformity or default 
that substantially impairs the value of the contract as a whole will none-
theless have reinstated the contract "if he accepts a non-conforming in-
stallment without seasonably notifying of cancellation .... " [U.C.C. § 2-
612.] ... A contract whose performance has become impracticable re-
quires the buyer, after notification by the seller, to offer reasonable alter-
natives for the modification or the termination of the affected contract; 
the buyer's failure to respond, within a reasonable period of time, causes 
the sales contract to lapse. [U.C.C. § 2-616(1) and (2).] ... In these and 
other related circumstances, article 2 urges the contracting parties to en-
gage in a continuing dialogue about what will constitute acceptable per-
formance of their sales contract .... It is entirely consistent with this 
article 2 policy to provide, as does[§ 1-207], a statutory methodology for 
the effective communication of objections .... 
From the vantage point of article 2, it is apparent that [§ 1-207] con-
templates a reservation of rights about some aspect of a possibly non-
conforming tender of goods or services or payment in a situation where 
the aggrieved party may prefer not to terminate the underlying contract 
as a whole .... We conclude, therefore, that in circumstances like the 
present, when performance of a sales contract has come to an end, [§ 1-
207] was not intended to empower a seller, as payee of a negotiable in-
strument, to alter that instrument by adding words of protest to a check 
68. County Frre Door Corp. v. C.F. Wooding Co., 202 Conn. 277, 520 A.2d 1028 (1987). 
69. 202 Conn. at 285, 287, 520 A.2d at 1032-33. 
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tendered by a buyer on condition that it be accepted in full satisfaction of 
an unliquidated debt. 10 
Whether or not this argument convinces, its importance lies in its 
form. Justice Peters rests her case neither on the apparent meaning 
nor on the legislative purpose and "rationale" of section 1-207; both 
forms of interpretation have proved to be inconclusive. 71 Although 
her argument might be described as logical interpretation in that it 
implicates the context of articles 2 and 3, in reality the "logic" is gos-
samer thin; there is no necessary reason that a possible "close and 
harmonious connection with article 2" should matter much in inter-
preting section 1-207, which is in a different article and could as easily 
stand on its own legs. 
Yet the numerous particular provisions that Justice Peters cites 
from article 2 do have the effect of establishing, through induction, 
one of the larger commercial principles of the UCC, that "the con-
tracting parties [should] engage in a continuing dialogue about what 
will constitute acceptable performance of their sales contract."72 This 
is an important principle, which would indeed be somewhat displaced 
by allowing a creditor unilaterally to convert a debtor's offer of com-
promise into a partial payment of a disputed debt. There is nothing 
improper about allowing such a principle to control interpretation of 
section 1-207, although other principles may conceivably point in a 
different direction. 13 
But it is the principles themselves that are potent in devefoping 
future commercial law. Their number need not be large, but they 
must be realized in order to be effective. For example, it bears consid-
ering whether the various article 2 provisions favoring timely dialogue 
between the parties to a sale are subsumed within the more general 
requirement of good faith in performance under section 1-203. H so, 
then this section should also be dispositive of the issue in section 1-
207; surely a creditor cannot, in good faith, unilaterally turn to his 
own advantage a debtor's offer of compromise.74 
What I have been suggesting is that large, systematically codified 
70. 202 Conn. at 287-90, 520 A.2d at 1033-35 (footnotes omitted). 
71. Contrast the more mundane approach of Flambeau Prod. Corp. v. Honeywell Informa-
tion Sys., Inc. 116 Wis. 2d 95, 341 N.W.2d 655 (1984) (reaching the same result). On Justice 
Peter's approach to commercial law, see Note, Ellen Ash Peters and the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 21 CoNN. L. REV. 753 (1989). 
72. 202 Conn. at 289, 520 A.2d at 1034. 
73. See Hom Waterproofing Corp. v. Brushwick Iron & Steel, Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 331, 497 
N.Y.S.2d 310, 316, 488 N.E.2d 56, 62 (1985) (emphasizing simplicity, clarity, and liberalization 
of commercial law). 
74. Contra J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 13-24, at 609. This seems to be the real 
issue, and not whether "the offerer is 'master of his offer.' " 
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bodies of law, such as the European codes or the UCC, gradually ef-
fect, or at least encourage, a different kind oflegal culture, in which, as 
such codes are integrated within a national legal heritage, general 
clauses and principles become more salient within an expanded inter-
pretive community. Because of the open texture of their rules, codes 
foster an altered legal posture; ancient judicial vigilance against the 
intrusive legislation may give way to a new ethos of cooperation in the 
development of law. To be sure, it remains uncertain whether the re-
sulting law will be, in fact, "better," or even more uniform.75 In the 
case of the UCC, a major American experiment in codification is only 
a generation old. The consequence of this experiment is still 
unfolding. 
75. For contrasting views of the UCC, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 20.22. 
